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Random Drug-Testing of Public School Student 
Athletes: A Permissible Search under the Fourth 
Amendment 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States is in an illicit drug use crisis. The social 
and economic costs of illicit drugs have forced America to de-
clare "war on drugs." In strictly business terms, the sale and 
consumption of illicit drugs comprises the fastest growing "in-
dustry" in the United States collecting huge profits from $110 
billion in annual sales. 1 More than ten million Americans 
abuse prescription drugs, about thirteen million are alcoholics, 
another twenty-two million have consumed cocaine, and at 
least twenty-three million smoke marijuana on a regular ba-
sis. 2 The harms and costs of illicit drug use touch every sector 
of American society. The most visible social and economic costs 
of illicit drug use are those associated with drug-related crime 
and crime prevention efforts. 
The workplace is another area which suffers significant 
social and economic costs. A recent survey of industrial rela-
tions executives indicates substance abuse is the top workplace 
concern. 3 This response was motivated because substance 
abuse costs employers $100 billion annually in lost productivi-
ty, increased absenteeism, and drug related injuries.4 The 
American Management Association and Arizona State Univer-
sity recently conducted a survey that reveals one out of every 
ten workers in the United States uses illicit drugs at work. 5 
Illicit drug use is particularly pervasive in school-aged chil-
dren. Recent studies demonstrate that 58% of high school se-
1. Ted W. Hunter, Understanding and Managing the Drug Abuse Revolution, 
41ST NATIONAL CONFERENCE PRocEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR PERSON· 
NEL ADMINISTRATION 265 (1989). 
2. Id. 
3. Albert R. Karr, Labor Letter, WALL ST. J., Apr. 11, 1989, at 1 (survey of 
257 industrial labor executives conducted by the firm of Jackson, Lewis, Schnitzler 
& Krupman). 
4. BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, ALcOHOL & DRUGS IN THE WORKPLACE: COSTS, 
CONTROLS, AND CONTROVERSIES, 7-8 (1986). 
5. J. MICHAEL WALSH & STEPHEN C. YOHAY, DRUG AND ALcOHOL ABUSE IN 
THE WORKPLACE: A GUIDE TO THE ISSUES 3-4 (1987). 
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niors had used drugs and 13% of high school seniors had used 
cocaine in the past year, more than double the figures in 
1975.6 One-half of all young people entering the work force for 
the fl.l"st time had used an illicit drug at least once within the 
previous year.7 Almost one-fourth, or approximately five mil-
lion, among those aged twelve to seventeen, had used drugs 
one or more times in their lives and almost one in ten, or 1.9 
million had used a drug illicitly in the past month. 8 Among 
eighteen to twenty-five year-olds, 17.5 million, constituting 
59%, had used drugs illicitly one or more times in their lives. 
Approximately 18%, or 5.3 million, had used drugs illicitly in 
the month before the survey.9 
Despite size, geographic location and socio-economic vari-
ables, survey data reveal that no high schools are drug-free. 
One-hundred percent of the seniors surveyed attended high 
schools where illicit drug use was reported, and 75% attended 
schools where more than half of their classmates had tried an 
illegal or controlled substance within the previous month. 10 
These statistics significantly understate the true picture of 
drug use in school-aged children. A large number of young drug 
users either drop out or are pushed out of school during their 
high school years. Simply stated, school-age children who are 
most heavily involved in drugs are not in school and are not 
counted in "student" drug use surveys.11 
Recreational drug use is not the only problem facing public 
schools. Student athletes in public schools, like all professional 
and amateur athletes, are motivated and encouraged to be the 
strongest and fastest competitors. Unfortunately, many student 
athletes resort to "doping"-the use of illicit performance-en-
hancing drugs. 12 Statistics are not available to demonstrate 
6. LAURO F. CAVAZOS, U.S. DEF'T OF EDUC., WHAT WORKS: SCHOOLS WITHOUT 
DRUGS 5 (1989). 
7. Hunter, supra note 1 at 266. 
8. NATIONAL INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, U.S. DEF'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 
SERVS., NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY ON DRUG ABUSE: HIGHLIGHTS 1988 9 (1990) 
[hereinafter DRUG ABUSE STATISTICS]. See also NATIONAL INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, 
U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY ON 
DRUG ABUSE: MAIN FINDINGS 1988 (1990); NATIONAL INST. OF DRUG ABUSE, U.S. 
DEPT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., USE OF LICIT AND ILLICIT DRUGS BY 
AMERICA'S HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS 1975-1984 (1985). 
9. DRUG ABUSE STATISTICS, supra note 8, at 9. 
10. NATIONAL COMM'N ON DRUG-FREE SCHS., U.S. DEPT OF EDUC., TOWARD A 
DRUG-FREE GENERATION: A NATION'S RESPONSIBILITY 1 (1990). 
11. Id. at 10-11. 
12. Allison Rose, Mandatory Drug Testing of College Athletes: Are Athletes Being 
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the use of many types of illicit performance-enhancing drugs. 
However, some studies demonstrate that the use of anabolic 
steroids is prevalent. A high school paper in Florida reported 
that 18% of the male students attending school used steroids13 
and a nation-wide study estimates that nearly 7%, or as many 
as 500,000, male high school seniors have used anabolic ste-
roids.14 In response to both recreational and performance en-
hancing illicit drug use, many professional and amateur ath-
letic associations and federations have adopted drug testing as 
a method of protecting the health and safety of individual par-
ticipants and a means of preserving the integrity of competition 
and promoting societal "drug-free" interests. 
A detailed examination of the harms related to illicit drug 
use in public schools is beyond the scope of this article. Howev-
er, the U.S. Supreme Court defined illicit drug use in public 
schools as a major social problem and has taken judicial notice 
that use of illicit drugs is detrimental to the effectiveness and 
safety of public schools. 15 The Court also stated that public 
schools may conduct reasonable searches in attempts to control 
and eliminate substance abuse.16 However, the Court has not 
directly examined the issue of drug testing in public schools. 
The lack of direction from the Court may be why few public 
schools have initiated any type of drug-testing program despite 
the fact that most public schools have written substance abuse 
policies and some type of substance abuse education.17 
In Schaill v. Tippecanoe County School Corp. (Schaill 1)18 
Denied Their Constitutional Rights?, 16 PEPP. L. REV. 45, 46 (1988) ("Doping is the 
administering or use of substances in any form alien to the body or of physiologi-
cal substances in abnormal amounts and with abnormal methods by healthy 
persons with the exclusive aim of attaining artificial and unfair increase of perfor-
mance in competition."); See Alvin P. Sanoff, Drug Problem in Athletics: It's Not 
Only the Pros, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 17, 1983, at 64. 
13. Rick Telander, A Peril for Athletes, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 24, 1988, at 
144. 
14. William E. Buckley et al., Estimated Prevalence of Anabolic Steroid Use 
Among Male High School Seniors, 260 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 3441, 3445 (1988). 
15. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339 (1985). 
16. Id. at 340. 
17. U.S. DEF'T OF EDUC. & U.S. DEF'T OF HEATH AND HUMAN SERVS., REPORT 
TO CONGRESS AND THE WHITE HOUSE ON THE NATURE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF FED· 
ERAL, STATE, AND LocAL DRUG PREVENTIO!'VEDUCATION PRoGRAMS 19-20 (1987) 
("Based on a random, stratified sample of 700 school districts, respondents indicate 
that nearly three-fourths of the districts have a written policy on substance abuse 
and three-fifths require substance abuse education for at least some grade 
levels . . . . Only 4% of school districts report having drug-testing programs.") 
(footnote omitted). 
18. 679 F. Supp. 833 (N.D. Ind.), atfd, (Schaill II), 864 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 
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an Indiana district court denied the declaratory and injunctive 
relief sought by two student athletes alleging that the imple-
mentation of Tippecanoe County School Corporation's (TSC's) 
random drug testing program: (1) violated their Fourth Amend-
ment rights by subjecting them to unreasonable searches and 
seizures; (2) interfered with their legitimate expectation of 
privacy; (3) violated the equal protection clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, and (4) violated their constitutional rights 
by predicating participation in interscholastic athletics upon 
the waiver of these rights.19 In Schaill II, the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals affirmed the district court decision concluding 
that individualized suspicion is not required for searches of stu-
dent athletes in public schools.20 This article focuses on ran-
dom urinalysis testing of public school athletes and examines 
the Fourth Amendment issues involved. 
II. TSC'S STUDENT ATHLETE DRUG EDUCATION AND TESTING 
PROGRAM 
TSC's Drug Education and Testing Program begins with a 
review of the seriousness of illicit drug and alcohol abuse in 
public schools and reference to information indicating signifi-
cant illicit drug use among TSC interscholastic athletes. The 
TSC program requires each student athlete to submit a consent 
form signed and dated by the student and his custodial parent 
or guardian prior to participating in any interscholastic 
sport.21 The program "involve[s] all participants in interscho-
1988). 
19. Schaill I, 679 F. Supp. at 848. 
20. Schaill II, 864 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1988). 
21. Schaill I, 679 F. Supp at 836. The consent form reads as follows: 
I d. 
I have received and have read and understand a copy of the "TSC 
DRUG EDUCATION AND TESTING PROGRAM." I desire that ~.,..,....,-...,..,.... 
---""7"" participate in this program and in the interscholastic athletic 
program of School and hereby voluntarily agree to be 
subject to its terms. I ~ccept the method of obtaining urine samples, test-
ing and analyses of such specimens, and all other aspects of the program. 
I agree to cooperate in furnishing urine specimens that may be required 
from time to time. 
I further agree and consent to the disclosure of the sampling, testing 
and results as provided for in this program. This consent is given pursu· 
ant to all State and Federal Privacy Statutes and is a waiver of rights to 
non-disclosure of such test records and results only to the extent of the 
disclosures authorized in the program. 
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lastic sports teams, both male and female, as well as members 
of cheerleading teams, all of whom are collectively denominated 
student athletes."22 The purposes of the TSC's program are: 
to prevent drug and alcohol usage, to educate student 
athletes as to the serious physical, mental and emotional 
harm caused by drug and alcohol abuse, to alert student 
athletes with possible drug problems to the potential 
harms, to prevent injury, illness and harm as a result of 
drug and alcohol abuse, and to maintain at TSC high 
schools an athletic environment free of alcohol and drug 
abuse.23 
TSC's program also states that student athletes hold posi-
tions of respect with the general student body and are therefore 
expected to be "good examples of conduct, sportsmanship and 
training, which includes avoiding drug and alcohol use. "24 
The athletic director and the head coach of each team are 
authorized to initiate and select an unlimited number of stu-
dent athletes to test. Students are assigned selection numbers 
which were drawn randomly from a box.26 Each athlete select-
ed is required to "provide a sample of urine in a verifiable man-
ner, but the collection of the sample is not physically ob-
served."26 A bottle containing the student's urine sample is 
labeled with his assigned number, not his name. His assigned 
number is indexed to his name on a master list. The student 
athlete and the athletic director consult the master list to pro-
tect against errors in the assignment of numbers. They initial 
the master list to evidence that the procedure is followed. 27 
Toxicologists at a "competent laboratory" use a variety of 
testing techniques to find "alcohol, street drugs ... and perfor-
mance-enhancing drugs (such as steroids)" in the urine sam-
ple.28 Once a sample tests positive, it is retested to confirm 
the results. 29 A sample tests positive if, after using at least 
two type of analyses, drug-residue substances are present in 
the system. The student athletes and their parents or guard-
22. Id. at 836-37. 
23. Id. at 837. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. at 838-39. 
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ians are given a chance for additional testing or other means of 
explaining the positive test result. 30 Any student athlete test-
ing positive without proper explanation would thereafter be 
subject to testing any time they choose to participate in inter-
scholastic athletic activity. In addition to random testing, TSC 
retained the right to test any student at any time that reason-
able suspicion of illicit drug or alcohol use exists. 81 
Student athletes who test positive are not academically 
disciplined, suspended or expelled. Rather, they incrementally 
lose the privilege to participate in interscholastic athletic activ-
ities. 82 The first time a student athlete tests positive for alco-
hol, he or she cannot participate in one out of five athletic con-
tests (200/o suspension). The first time he or she tests positive 
for drugs, he or she cannot participate in approximately one 
out of three athletic events (300/o suspension). The second, third 
and fourth occurrences of either alcohol or drug result in a 500/o 
suspension, a full calendar-year suspension, and an interscho-
lastic career suspension, respectively. The fll'st and second sus-
pensions can be reduced by participation in approved counsel-
ing.88 
Ill. FOURTH AMENDMENT 
The principles of the Fourth Amendment are paramount in 
determining the legality of any drug testing program in public 
schools. The Fourth Amendment provides in relevant part: 
[the] right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, shall not be violated but upon probable cause, support-
ed by Oath or affirmations, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized.84 
To successfully challenge a drug and alcohol testing program 
under the Fourth Amendment, litigants must establish fll'st, 
that the testing constitutes a search under the Amendment, 85 
30. !d. at 837. 
31. !d. 
32. Id. 
33. I d. at 837-38. 
34. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added). 
35. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 333 (1985). 
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and second, that the search is unreasonable. 36 
A. Urinalysis Testing of Student Athletes by TSC Constitutes a 
Search Under the Fourth Amendment 
Relying on Supreme Court precedent, the district and ap-
pellate court in Schaill I and Schaill II found that activities of 
public school officials have long been considered state actions 
subject to the Fourth Amendment through the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 37 
The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, 
protects the citizen against the State itself and all of its 
creatures-Boards of Education not excepted. These have, of 
course, important, delicate, and highly discretionary func-
tions, but none that they may not perform within the limits of 
the Bill of Rights. That they are educating the young for 
citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitution-
al freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the 
free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important 
principles of our government as mere platitudes.38 
In New Jersey v. T.L.0., 39 the Court rejected notions that 
school officials act as parental surrogates and denied Fourth 
Amendment immunity based on the doctrine of in loco parentis. 
The Court stated that "in carrying out searches and other dis-
ciplinary functions pursuant to such policies, school officials act 
as representatives of the State, not merely as surrogates for 
the parents, and they cannot claim the parent's immunity from 
the stricture of the Fourth Amendment. "40 Urinalysis testing 
by public school officials is state action and is therefore a 
Fourth Amendment search subject to scrutiny by the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 41 
36. Id. at 337. 
37. Schaill I, 679 F. Supp. at 855; Schaill II, 864 F.2d at 1313·14. 
38. West Virginia State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943). 
39. 469 u.s. 325 (1985). 
40. Id. at 336-37. 
41. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 
27-28 (1949). The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in relevant part, that "no State 
shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of 
law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1. See also Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 30-31 
(1963) (reaffirming that "the Fourth Amendment 'is enforceable against . . . [the 
states] by the same sanction of exclusion as is used against the Federal Govern· 
ment,' by the application of the same constitutional standard prohibiting 'unreason· 
able searches and seizures.'") (quoting Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655). 
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The appellate court also found urinalysis testing to be a 
"search" under the Fourth Amendment. The U.S. Supreme 
Court has held that a "search" occurs when an expectation of 
privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is in-
fringed."42 Since Schaill I and Schaill II were decided in 1988, 
the U.S. Supreme Court has specifically held that collecting 
and testing urine intrudes upon reasonable expectations of 
privacy and must be deemed a search under the Fourth 
Amendment. 43 
B. Urinalysis Testing of Student Athletes by TSC is a Reason-
able Search Under The Fourth Amendment 
In Schaill I, the district court acknowledged that students 
do not "shed their constitutional rights ... at the schoolhouse 
gates," but also recognized a narrowing of that concept in re-
cent years.44 Relying on the Supreme Court's ruling in T.L.O., 
both the district and appellate courts found urinalysis testing 
of student athletes to be a reasonable search under the Fourth 
Amendment without a demonstration of individualized suspi-
cion.45 
1. Traditional reasonable suspicion requirements 
Generally, federal courts have held that searches without a 
warrant are "per se" unreasonable and therefore unlawful.46 
However, the Supreme Court has allowed "a few specifically 
established and well delineated exceptions."47 In T.L.O., the 
Court analogized searches in a school setting to those in both 
administrative settings and those requiring "reasonable suspi-
cion" concluding that: 
[T]he accommodation of the privacy interests of schoolchildren 
with the substantial need of teachers and administrators for 
freedom to maintain order in the schools does not require 
strict adherence to the requirement that searches be based on 
42. Schaill II, 864 F.2d at 1311-12 (quoting United States v. Jackson, 466 U.S. 
109, 113 (1984). 
43. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989); 
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989). 
44. Schaill I, 679 F. Supp. at 851 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Com-
munity Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)). 
45. Id. at 855-58; Schaill II, 864 F.2d at 1322. 
46. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). 
47. Id. 
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probable cause .... 48 
Applying this analysis, the T.L.O. Court upheld as "reason-
able" the warrantless search of a school girl's purse based on a 
reasonable suspicion that the student had been smoking on 
school grounds in violation of school rules.49 After noting that 
the opening of the student's purse was "undoubtedly a severe 
violation of subjective expectations of privacy,"50 the Court 
canvassed the legitimate governmental interests which were 
furthered by the search. The Court observed that "events call-
ing for discipline are frequent occurrences and sometimes re-
quire immediate, effective action. "51 Further, the particular 
demands of the school environment require teachers to use 
"swift and informal disciplinary procedures. "52 
In determining the level of suspicion required before a 
search may be conducted, the appellate court in Schaill II 
sought to "balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on 
the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the im-
portance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the 
intrusion."53 The appellate court recognized that the U.S. Su-
preme Court, in T.L.O., had already struck the balance in the 
context of school searches, and had determined that probable 
cause and warrant requirements did not apply.54 The test an-
nounced in T.L.O., which is specific to searches of students in 
public schools by school authorities, states that "the legality of 
a search of a student should depend simply on the reasonable-
ness, under all the circumstances of the search."55 The T.L.O. 
Court emphasized that: 
48. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341; See also id. at 340 {Powell, J. concurring) ("The 
fundamental command of the Fourth Amendment is that searches and seizures be 
reasonable, and although 'both the concept of probable cause and the requirement 
of a warrant bear on the reasonableness of a search . . . in certain limited cir-
cumstances neither is required.") (quoting Almedia-Sanchez v. United States, 413 
u.s. 266, 277 (1973)). 
49. Id. at 346. 
50. Schaill II, 864 F.2d at 1314 (quoting 469 U.S. at 338). 
51. Id. (quoting 469 U.S. at 339). 
52. Id. (quoting 469 U.S. at 340). 
53. Id. at 1313 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983); See 
also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979) (In balancing the competing interests 
under the Fourth Amendment, "[c]ourts must consider the scope of the particular 
intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, 
and the place in which it is conducted.") 
54. Schaill II, 864 F. 2d at 1314. 
55. 469 U.S. at 341. 
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The determination of the standard of reasonableness govern-
ing any specific class of searches requires "balancing the need 
to search against the invasion which the search entails." On 
one side of the balance are arrayed the individual's legitimate 
expectations of privacy and personal security; on the other, 
the government's need for effective methods to deal with 
breaches of public order. 56 
The T.L.O. Court found that a public school's interests in 
detecting drug use will outweigh intrusion upon the athlete's 
privacy expectations if the school can establish that first, the 
search was "justified at its inception" and second, the search 
"was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which 
justified the interference in the first place. "57 The first prong 
of the two-part test announced in T.L. 0. appears to imply that 
reasonable individualized suspicion is required for a search to 
be justified. 
Under ordinary circumstances, a search of a student by a 
teacher or other school official will be "justified at its incep-
tion" when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that 
the search will tum up evidence that the student has violated 
or is violating either the law or the rules of the school. Such a 
search will be permissible in its scope when the measures 
adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search 
and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the 
student and the nature of the infraction. 58 
2. Administrative search exception to individualized suspicion 
Despite the language of the two-part test, "[t]he T.L.O. 
Court expressly left open" the requirement of individualized 
suspicion.59 The T.L.O. Court stated: 
We do not decide whether individualized suspicion is an es-
sential element of the reasonableness standard we adopt for 
searches by school authorities. In other contexts, however, we 
have held that although "some quantum of individualized 
suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a constitutional search 
56. ld. at 337 (citation omitted) (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 
523, 536-37 (1967)). 
57. Id. at 341 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)). 
58. Id. at 341-42 (footnotes omitted). 
59. Schaill I, 679 F. Supp. at 852. 
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or seizure[,]" ... the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreduc-
ible requirement of such suspicion. 60 
The T.L. 0. Court continued: 
Exceptions to the requirement of individualized suspicion are 
generally appropriate only where the privacy interests impli-
cated by a search are minimal and where "other safeguards" 
are available "to assure that the individual's reasonable ex-
pectations of privacy is not 'subject to the discretion of the 
official in the field.'1161 
107 
The appellate court in Schaill II reported "several carefully de-
fmed situations where the Court has recognized that searches 
may be conducted in the absence of any grounds to believe that 
the individual searched has violated the law.1162 These situa-
tions include suspicionless searches of private dwellings, auto-
mobiles, airline passengers, travelers at borders and check-
points and persons subject to searches in the administrative 
context.63 
The most relevant of the exceptions reported is the admin-
istrative search exception. The appellate court's examination of 
U.S. Supreme Court cases revealed that four important factors 
are considered in "approving [warrantless, suspicionless] 
searches in [the administrative search] context."64 First, an in-
dustry of pervasive regulation where search participants have 
diminished expectations of privacy and have implicitly or ex-
plicitly consented to searches through voluntary decisions to 
enter regulated industries.65 Second, the regulatory scheme 
which authorizes the search must further substantial govern-
mental interests and the search must be necessary to further 
the regulatory scheme. Generally, the imposition of a warrant 
or reasonable suspicion standard must frustrate the purposes 
of the regulatory scheme and an alternate, less intrusive means 
of detection would not sufficiently serve the government's 
60. 469 U.S. at 342 n.8 (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 
543, 560-561 (1976)); See also Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 
(1967). 
61. Id. at 342 n.8 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 655 (1979) (cita-
tion omitted)). 
62. Schaill II, 864 F.2d at 1315-16. 
63. Id. at 1316-17 (footnotes and citations omitted). 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
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inspections, including urinalysis testing, through their volun-
tary decision to participate. Mandatory physical examinations, 
which include providing urine samples, are integral to almost 
all athletic programs and have long been required by TSC's 
program.73 Moreover, the Indiana High School Athletic Associ-
ation requirements included minimum grades, residency, eligi-
bility and submission to training rules, including prohibitions 
on smoking, drinking and drug use both on and off school pre-
mises. 74 Finally, the pervasiveness and visibility of drug test-
ing of professional, collegiate and olympic athletes seriously 
diminishes student athletes' expectations of privacy. The court 
observed that "[t]he suspension and disqualification of prom-
inent athletes on the basis of positive urinalysis results has 
been the subject of intense publicity all over the world. "75 
2. Urinalysis testing of student athletes is an appropriate 
means to promote substantial interests 
The appellate court in Schaill II affirmed the trial court's 
fmding that TSC had made a reasonable decision in imple-
menting its urinalysis program and held "that alternative 
methods of investigation would not adequately serve the 
school's interest in detection and deterrence of [illicit] drug 
use."76 TSC's urinalysis testing of student athletes is an ap-
propriate means to combat illicit drug use among school-aged 
children and student athletes. 77 
In affirming the trial court's decision, the appellate court 
agreed that TSC's student athlete urinalysis testing program 
would: protect the health and safety of student athletes; pre-
serve the integrity of interscholastic competition; promote stu-
dent and community support for interscholastic athletics; and 
promote "drug-free" interests among all school-aged children 
throughout the public school system. 78 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. at 1321. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
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3. TSC's urinalysis testing program provides adequate safe-
guards against harassment and intimidation by limiting the 
discretion of the inspecting school officials 
As previously described, TSC' s urinalysis testing program 
is not subject to the discretion of school officials in the field. 79 
Student athletes are on notice that they may be randomly 
selected for testing through a procedure which prohibits dis-
cretion as to who will be chosen. Student athletes are also 
aware of specific procedures governing the manner in which 
the sample is obtained, handled, tested and how test results 
may be challenged. These provisions of TSC's testing program 
provide adequate safeguards against school officials using test-
ing for the purpose of harassment or intimidation. 
4. TSC's urinalysis testing is not intended to discover evidence 
of criminal activity 
After reviewing the basis for the Supreme Court's decisions 
in T.L.O. and O'Connor v. Ortega,80 the appellate court in 
Schaill II concluded that searches conducted for civil or non-
punitive purposes may be valid in circumstances where search-
es conducted as part of a criminal investigation would not be 
permissible. The court also stated that reasonable suspicion 
requirements "traditionally (though not exclusively) applied to 
law enforcement investigations, would unnecessarily intrude 
upon the purposes of the classroom or workplace."81 The dis-
tinction between law enforcement investigations and the en-
forcement of school rules is "that a school official's primary 
mission is not to ferret out crime, but is instead to teach stu-
dents in a safe and secure learning environment. "82 
TSC's urinalysis testing program was instituted to address 
the negative consequences of illicit drug use and to enforce 
school and interscholastic athletic rules. The program used 
progressive sanctions that could be reduced through voluntary 
participation in approved drug counseling. 83 The program is 
"educational, diagnostic, and preventative, as opposed to puni-
79. See supra notes 21-33 and accompanying text. 
80. 480 u.s. 709 (1987). 
81. Schaill II, 864 F.2d at 1314. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 1322. 
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tive or disciplinary"84 and was not intended to discover evi-
dence of unlawful activity for use in criminal prosecutions.86 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Illicit drug use is a major problem throughout all sectors of 
American society, particularly among school-aged children and 
interscholastic athletes. The U.S. District Court for the North-
ern District of Indiana and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit found that TSC's random drug testing program 
did not violate privacy rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amend-
ment. Individual suspicion of drug use is not required in order 
to test students in the public schools for drugs. Although the 
U.S. Supreme Court has not yet specifically addressed random 
drug testing in public schools, recent Court decisions upholding 
random drug testing in the workplace support both Schaill 
decisions.86 Public school officials should be allowed and en-
couraged to adopt urinalysis testing programs similar to TSC's 
Student Athlete Drug Education and Testing Program for the 
purpose of detecting and deterring drug use among school-aged 
children. 
Paul K. Madsen 
84. Schaill I, 679 F. Supp. at 836. 
85. Schaill II, 864 F.2d at 1322. 
86. In Skinner, the U.S. Supreme Court defined the standard of reasonableness 
stating: 
[W]hen the balance of interests precludes insistent on a showing of proba-
ble cause, we have usually required 'some quantum of individualized 
suspicion' before concluding that a search is reasonable. We made it clear, 
however, that a showing of individualized suspicion is not a constitutional 
floor, below which a search must be presumed unreasonable. In limited 
circumstances, where the privacy interests are minimal, and where an 
important governmental interest furthered by the intrusion would be 
placed in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized suspicion, a search 
may be reasonably despite the absence of such suspicion. 
489 U.S. 602, 624 (1989) (citations omitted). 
